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SECURED TRANSACTIONS
I. COURT ADOPTS "REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION" RULE IN THE
EVENT OF FAILURE TO NOTIFY IN A DEFAULT SALE
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has determined that a
creditor's failure to give notice of the sale of a debtor's collateral
is not an absolute bar to obtaining a deficiency judgment. Fail-
ure to give notice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that
the collateral is worth at least the amount of the debt. The bur-
den of proving otherwise rests on the secured party.
In Mathias v. Hicks1 a creditor failed to follow the notice
requirement of section 36-9-504(3) of the South Carolina Code
of Laws.2 Mathias sold his restaurant to Hicks, taking a note for
approximately $18,000 secured by fixtures, furniture, and equip-
ment in the restaurant. About a year and a half after she pur-
chased the restaurant, Hicks closed its doors and defaulted on
the note, still owing almost $16,500. Following default, Mathias
removed the equipment and, without notifying Hicks, requested
bids from three local restaurant equipment dealers. He sold the
equipment to the highest bidder for $1,500 and sought a defi-
ciency judgment from Hicks for the balance due. Hicks claimed
1. 294 S.C. 305, 363 S.E.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1987).
2. The section reads as follows:
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may
be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a
unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect
of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must
be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to de-
cline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized mar-
ket, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or rea-
sonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other intended
disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, and
except in the case of consumer goods to any other person who has a security
interest in the collateral and who has duly filed a financing statement indexed
in the name of the debtor in this State or who is known by the secured party to
have a security interest in the collateral. The secured party may buy at any
public sale and if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized
market or is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed standard price
quotations he may buy at private sale.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-504(3) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (emphasis added).
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that Mathias' failure to notify her of the sale had violated the
statutory requirement of notice and, therefore, barred him from
obtaining a deficiency judgment. On the other hand, Mathias ar-
gued that failure to give notice was not an absolute bar to recov-
ering the deficiency. He asserted that this failure created a re-
buttable presumption that the collateral was worth the amount
of the debt and that the creditor then had the burden of proving
otherwise. The trial court and the court of appeals agreed with
Ms. Hicks, and the courts granted Mathias the deficiency
judgment.
The statute allows for a deficiency judgment 3 but also pro-
vides that "every aspect of the disposition. . . must be commer-
cially reasonable." A second requirement of the statute is that
"reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale
. . . or other intended disposition. . . made shall be sent by the
secured party to the debtor."4 A literal reading shows that these
requirements are distinct and separate. First, the statute re-
quires commercial reasonableness. Second, it requires notice.
The statute mandates that reasonable notice "shall be sent."'
There can be no misunderstanding of that requirement; it means
that notice must be sent.'
Both parties agreed that the requisite notice was not given,
but they disagreed on the appropriate sanction for such failure.
The court in Mathias focused on "the failure of the UCC to
specify a bar to deficiency for lack of notice."7 The statute deal-
3. Id. § 36-9-504(2).
4. Id. § 36-9-504(3).
5. Id.
6. It might be appropriate here to note certain policies and requirements within
the Uniform Commercial Code. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-106(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976) states
that remedies are to be liberally administered "to the end that the aggrieved party may
be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed but neither conse-
quential or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this
act or by other rule of law." In this case the aggrieved party, the creditor Mathias, had
been injured by the loss of his right to receive future payments in the total amount of
$15,000. Therefore, section 36-1-106 suggests that he should be able to recover it all. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 36-9-507(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976), however, seems to indicate otherwise: that
because of Mathias's failure to supply notice, he may have forfeited his right to a defi-
ciency. According to S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-103 (Law. Co-op. 1976), conflicts under the
Code should be resolved by referring to prior common law. The common law in South
Carolina clearly indicates that failure to notify results in forfeiture of a right to a defi-
ciency judgment. See Johnson Cotton Co. v. Cannon, 242 S.C. 42, 129 S.E.2d 750 (1963).
7. 294 S.C. at 309, 363 S.E.2d at 916.
224 [Vol. 40
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ing with liability for noncompliance states:
If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in
accordance with the provisions of this part disposition may be
ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions. If
the disposition has occurred the debtor or any person entitled
to notification . . . has a right to recover from the secured
party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provi-
sions of this part.'
Confusion arises from interpretation of the permissive lan-
guage in this section ("may be ordered") and the mandatory
construction of the notice requirement itself.
Other jurisdictions have analyzed the problem of a credi-
tor's deviation from U.C.C. requirements in repossessing or
reselling collateral, resulting in three different remedies.9
At one extreme, failure to follow Article 9 triggers an abso-
lute bar to recovery of a deficiency judgment.'0 Skeels v. Univer-
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-507(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
9. See J. WHITE & R. SuihmRs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE, § 26-15 (2d ed. 1980).
10. Jurisdictions that have adopted the absolute bar rule are ARKANSAS: First
State Bank of Morrilton v. Hallett, 291 Ark. 37, 722 S.W.2d 555 (1987); CALIFORNIA:
Backes v. Village Corner, Inc., 197 Cal. App. 3d 209, 242 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1987); DELA-
WARE: Wilmington Trust v. Conner, 415 A.2d 773 (Del. 1980); DISTRICT OF COLUM-
BIA: Brown v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 A.2d 1125 (D.C. 1985); IOWA:
Barnhouse v. Hawkeye State Bank, 406 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1987); KANSAS: Topeka Dat-
sun Motor Co. v. Stratton, 12 Kan. App. 2d 95, 736 P.2d 82 (1987) (absolute bar if con-
sumer transaction; rebuttable presumption if commercial transaction); KENTUCKY:
Bank Josephine v. Conn, 599 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); MAINE: Union Trust Co.
of Ellsworth v. Hardy, 400 A.2d 384 (Me. 1979); MICHIGAN: State Bank of Standish v.
Keysor, 166 Mich. App. 93, 419 N.W.2d 752 (1988); MONTANA: Westmont Tractor Co.
v. Continental I, Inc., 731 P.2d 327 (Mont. 1986); NEBRASKA: Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Haumont, 220 Neb. 509, 371 N.W.2d 97 (1985); NEW JERSEY: Midlantic Natl Bank v.
Coyne, 222 N.J.Super. 649, 537 A.2d 798 (1987) (bar if no notice given; rebuttable pre-
sumption only if notice was given but unfair price received); NEW YORK: First City
Div. of Chase Lincoln First Bank v. Vitale, 123 A.D.2d 510, N.Y.S.2d 766 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987); OHIO: Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Stockwell, 10 Ohio App. 3d 30, 460 N.E.2d, 303
(1983); SOUTH DAKOTA: First Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. Kehn Ranch, Inc., 394
N.W.2d 709 (S.D. 1986); TENNESSEE: Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Dyersburg Prod.
Credit Ass'n, 728 S.W.2d 10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (court never reached issue but im-
plied the absolute bar rule); UTAH: Haggis Management v. Turtle Management, 745
P.2d 442, (Utah 1985); VERMONT: United States v. Lang, 610 F. Supp. 292 (D. Vt.
1985), VIRGINIA: In re Bishop, 482 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1973) (applying Virginia law);
WISCONSIN: Vic Hansen & Sons, Inc. v. Crowley, 57 Wis. 2d 106, 203, N.W.2d 728
(1973); Southern Wis. Cattle Credit Co. v. Lemkau, 140 Wis. 2d 830, 412 N.W.2d 159
(Ct. App. 1987); WYOMING: Stephens v. Sheridan Pub. Employees Fed. Credit Union,
594 P.2d 473 (Wyo. 1979).
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sal C.IT. Credit Corp.1" is often quoted for the theory behind
this rule:
[T]o permit recovery by the security holder of a loss in dispos-
ing of collateral when no notice has been given, permits a con-
tinuation of the evil which the Commercial Code sought to cor-
rect. The owner should have an opportunity to bid at the sale.
It was the secret disposition of collateral by chattel mortgage
owners . . . which the Code sought to correct. . . .A security
holder who disposes of collateral without notice denies to the
debtor his right of redemption which is provided him in Sec-
tion 9-506. In my view, it must be held that a security holder
who sells without notice may not look to the debtor for any
lOSS. 1 2
At the other extreme, a second possible consequence of a
creditor's misconduct automatically would allow recovery of a
deficiency judgment although subject to set-off by the amount of
any damages suffered by the debtor."' These damages usually
are calculated as the difference between the fair market value of
the collateral and the actual resale price.14 In this line of cases,
the burden of proof regarding fair market value falls on the
debtor. The Mathias court did not address this alternative, per-
haps because of its limited acceptance in few jurisdictions.
The emerging majority of courts follow a middle ground in
the event of a creditor's violation. They follow the theory of a
"rebuttable presumption,"'1 5 the option followed in Mathias.
11. 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (action by automobile dealer against finance
company which had removed all of dealer's cars from lot), vacated, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir.
1964).
12. Id. at 702.
13. Jurisdictions that have adopted the set-off rule are ALABAMA: Jones v. First
Nat'l Bank, 505 So. 2d 352 (Ala. 1987); ARIZONA: Gulf Homes, Inc. v. Goubeaux, 136
Ariz. 33, 664 P.2d 183 (1983); OKLAHOMA: Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Young, 612 P.2d 1357
(Okla. 1980).
14. J. WmiTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 26-15.
15. Jurisdictions that have adopted the rebuttable presumption rule are ALASKA:
Dischner v. United Bank Alaska, 725 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1986); COLORADO: First Char-
ter Lease Co. v. McAl, Inc., 679 P.2d 114 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); CONNECTICUT: Con-
necticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Incendy, 207 Conn. 15, 540 A.2d 32 (1988); FLORIDA:
Landmark First Nat'l Bank v. Gepetto's Tale 0' the Whale, Inc., 498 So. 2d 920 (Fla.
1986); GEORGIA: Emmons v. Burkett, 256 Ga. 855, 353 S.E.2d 908 (1987); HAWAII:
Liberty Bank v. Honolulu Providoring, Inc., 65 Haw. 273, 650 P.2d 576 (1982); Bank of
Hawaii v. Davis Radio Sales & Serv., 727 P.2d 419 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986); IDAHO: Butte
County Bank v. Hobley, 109 Idaho 40, 707 P.2d 513 (Ct. App. 1985); ILLINOIS: Papas v.
[Vol. 40
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This rule presumes that the collateral is worth at least the
amount of the debt. In order to recover a deficiency, the secured
party bears the burden of proving that the value of the collateral
did not equal the debt at the time of the sale. The most difficult
problem faced here is the amount and character of proof needed
to sufficiently rebut the presumption. In Weaver v. O'Meara
Motor Co., 16 sufficient proof consisted of first soliciting offers
from a four-state area, followed by providing depositions of two
appraisers regarding the property's value.
In First National Bank of Dothan v. Rikki Tikki Tavi,
Inc.," another question of a rebuttable presumption arose. The
creditor bank repossessed restaurant equipment and notified the
debtor of its intent to sell. The bank then contacted three local
appraisers and received bids from two. The bank actively sought
the participation of the restaurant/debtor in its attempts to as-
certain the value of the collateral. The court considered this ade-
quate evidence of the value of the restaurant equipment. In
Dothan, there was no question regarding notice. Additionally,
Speizman, 158 Ill. App. 3d 557, 511 N.E.2d 768 (1987); INDIANA: Bloomington Nat'l
Bank v. Goodman Distrib., Inc., 482 N.E.2d 727 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); KANSAS: Garden
Nat'l Bank v. Cada, 241 Kan. 494, 738 P.2d 429 (1987) (But see Topeka Datsun Motor
Co. v. Stratton, 12 Kan. App. 2d 95, 736 P.2d 82 (1987)) (absolute bar if consumer,
rather than commercial, transaction)); MARYLAND: DiDomenico v. First Nat'l Bank,
57 Md. App. 62, 468 A.2d 1046 (1984), aff'd, 302 Md. 290, 487 A.2d 646 (1985); MASSA-
CHUSETTS: Poti Holding Co. v. Piggott, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 275, 444 N.E.2d 1311
(1983); In re Travis, 67 Bankr. 406 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986); MINNESOTA: Chemlease
Worldwide, Inc. v. Brace, Inc., 338 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983) (burden on debtor to show
no notice; then burden on secured party to prove fair price); MISSISSIPPI: McKee v.
Mississippi Bank & Trust Co., 366 So. 2d 234 (Miss. 1979); MISSOURI: Wirth v.
Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); NEVADA: U C Leasing v. Laughlin, 96
Nev. 157, 606 P.2d 167 (1980); NEW JERSEY: Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Coyne, 222 N.J.
Super. 649, 537 A.2d 798 (1987) (rebuttable presumption only if notice given but unfair
price received; bar if no notice given); NEW MEXICO: First Nat'l Bank v. Jiron, 106
N.M. 261, 741 P.2d 1382 (1987); NEW YORK: Telmark, Inc. v. Lavigne, 124 A.D.2d
1055, 508 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1986); NORTH CAROLINA: Church v. Mickler, 55 N.C. App.
724, 287 S.E.2d 131 (1982); NORTH DAKOTA: Farmers State Bank v. Thompson, 372
N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1985); OREGON: Meyers v. Arnold, 57 Or. App. 503, 645 P.2d 577
(1982); PENNSYLVANIA: Savoy v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., 503 Pa. 74, 468
A.2d 465 (1983); RHODE ISLAND: Associates Capital Serv. Corp. v. Riccardi, 122 R.I.
434, 408 A.2d 930 (1979); TEXAS: General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Byrd, 707
S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1986); WASHINGTON: Rotta v. Early Indus. Corp., 47
Wash. App. 21, 733 P.2d 576 (1987).
16. 452 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1969) (buyer defaulted on installment contracts with which
he had bought trucks; seller repossessed, resold, and sought deficiency judgment).
17. 445 So. 2d 889 (Ala. 1984).
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the debtor was fully involved in the process of obtaining bids
-a far cry from the one-sided process encompassed in Mathias.
Mathias substantially reduced this necessary threshold of
evidence by accepting three hand-written bids from the only
three local dealers contacted about the sale of the equipment."8
No appraisal was made; no offering of sale outside the immedi-
ate area was attempted; no alternative means of disposal were
explored. Following the court's analysis, this prima facie showing
of value was sufficient to sustain the burden of proof.
Previously, the South Carolina Court of Appeals had recog-
nized the importance of the policy underlying the notice require-
ment. The court considered this issue in General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corp. v. Carter's and said that
[t]he purpose of Section 36-9-504(3) is to enable a debtor to
protect his interest in the collateral by paying the debt, finding
a buyer or being present at the sale to bid on the collateral or
have others to do so, to the end that the secured property may
not be sacrificed by sale at less than true value.2°
Unfortunately for the defendant in Mathias, the Carter case was
vacated barely one month before her case was heard.2
The Mathias court found that the statute gives no guidance
in the proper method to sanction an offending party.22 The
court, therefore, may have looked to the pre-U.C.C. judicial
standard."
18. 294 S.C. at 307, 363 S.E.2d at 915. See also Record at 18-23 and 85-87.
19. 290 S.C. 216, 349 S.E.2d 342 (Ct. App. 1986), appeal dismissed, 293 S.C. 465,
361 S.E.2d 620 (1987), cause vacated, 293 S.C. 466, S.E.2d 620 (Ct. App. 1987) (action by
secured party against consumer debtor for deficiency judgment following resale of repos-
sessed automobile).
20. 290 S.C. at 219, 349 S.E.2d at 343.
21. The reason given for vacating the judgment was that the parties had settled
"contingent upon the vacation of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals." 293 S.C. at 466,
361 S.E.2d at 620.
22. "Given the divergency of authority, we must determine the approach to be
taken in South Carolina. This issue has not been decided under the Uniform Commercial
Code in this state." 294 S.C. at 309, 363 S.E.2d at 916. S. C. CODE ANN § 36-9-507 (Law.
Co-op. 1976) seems to indicate that sanctions are available. The court, however, did not
focus on this aspect.
23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-103 (Law. Co-op. 1976) reads as follows:
Supplementary general principles of law applicable. Unless displaced by the
particular provisions of this act, the principles of law and equity, including the
law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent,
estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or
228 [Vol. 40
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Prior to the adoption of the U.C.C., the South Carolina Su-
preme Court dealt with the notice requirement in Johnson Cot-
ton Co. v. Cannon.24 Although the court found that there had
been adequate notice given, it said that
[i]f the respondent had not given notice to the appellants of
the time and place of sale, we would have no hesitation in
holding that a deviation from the terms of the statute would
invalidate the attempted sale pursuant thereto, because the
deviation, however slight, would be a warrant for other and
greater departures from the definite and exact requirements of
the statute.
25
The U.C.C. provides that, unless displaced by the Code, com-
mon law should supplement its provisions. Since the U.C.C. is
silent as to denial of a deficiency judgment,2" the court of ap-
peals should have followed the pre-Code rule of Johnson Cotton
and found that failure to give notice would bar a deficiency
judgment.
A more recent South Carolina Supreme Court case, Altman
Tractor & Equipment Co. v. Weaver,27 discussed the sufficiency
of notice under section 36-9-504(3).2 s In upholding a lower court
decision, the court stated that "[a]ll that is required is that the
secured party take reasonable steps to see that the debtor is no-
tified. . . .The trial judge was correct in holding reasonable no-
tification of the sale had been sent. Allowance of a deficiency
judgment and denial of the counterclaim was therefore
proper.'29 Although this issue was not reached, the court's state-
ment implies that had no notice been attempted, a deficiency
judgment would not have been allowed. Though briefly men-
tioned by the court in Mathias,30 Altman Tractor failed to sway
other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.
Id.
24. 242 S.C. 42, 129 S.E.2d 750 (1963) (following default on installment payments
and after resale of the collateral, a deficiency judgment was sought against commercial
buyers of an irrigation system).
25. Id. at 55, 129 S.E.2d at 757.
26. S.C. CODE ANN § 36-1-103 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
27. 288 S.C. 449, 343 S.E.2d 444 (1986) (secured party sued for deficiency judgment
following default, repossession, and resale of combine and grain header).
28. See supra note 2.
29. 288 S.C. at 451, 343 S.E.2d at 445.
30. "The question was not reached in Altman Tractor because the Supreme Court
found reasonable notification." 294 S.C. at 309, 363 S.E.2d at 916.
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its decision.
The effects of Mathias appear to be threefold: first, on the
notice requirement itself; second, on creditor's rights; and third,
on the rights of the debtor. As a result of this decision, the no-
tice requirement has lost any real meaning. If a creditor decides
not to notify the debtor of a default sale, all he needs to do is
obtain a few bids on the collateral. Because of this, the creditor's
rights in the collateral have expanded to the severe detriment of
the debtor's rights. The debtor no longer can count on notice
being given to allow him an opportunity to protect his interests.
Had the court isolated its holding to include only commercial
transactions, its policy arguments and sanctions might be more
palatable despite the divergence from prior South Carolina law.
By eliminating the notice requirement, Mathias appears to have
substantially damaged every debtor's rights and opportunities
regarding his collateral following a default sale, while opening
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